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Abstract
The success of modern Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies depends critically
on the ability to learn non-linear functional dependencies from large, high dimen-
sional data sets. Despite recent high-profile successes, empirical evidence indi-
cates that the high predictive performance is often paired with low robustness,
making AI systems potentially vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this report, we
provide a simple intuitive argument suggesting that high performance and vulner-
ability are intrinsically coupled, and largely dependent on the geometry of typical,
high-dimensional data sets. Our work highlights a major potential pitfall of modern
AI systems, and suggests practical research directions to ameliorate the problem.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence | Adversarial Attacks | High-dimensional geom-
etry | Computer Security
1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is colonising all areas of human endeavour, and its impact
is widely predicted to grow exponentially in the next decades. Techniques such as
deep learning have significantly improved on the state of the art in areas as diverse as
computer vision, speech recognition and medical imaging [29, 18, 26, 35, 16], and have
already reached super-human performance in games such as GO and classical ATARI
video games [17, 25]. Buoyed by these successes, many researchers are heralding a
new golden age for AI, and many governments and major corporations have started
multi-billion dollar research investments in the development and application of AI.
Despite these undeniable achievements, the mathematical and statistical bases for
AI’s success, and consequently its general applicability, remain largely unclear. Tech-
niques such as deep learning work by defining a broad class of possible input/ output
functions underpinning the structure of the data. Such functional classes are encoded
in the network structure, and in the so called activation functions, and are usually suf-
ficiently general as to approximate arbitrarily well any smooth function. The specific
predictive function is chosen by optimising a measure of fit to a subset of the data
(training data), and performance is evaluated statistically over a held out subset of
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the data (test set). The training procedure (learning) is normally some variation of
(stochastic) gradient descent, and much of deep learning research is concerned with
the development of heuristic methods to improve the learning procedure or with the
engineering of network architectures tailored to specialized tasks. The success of this
approach has largely taken by surprise even the practitioners: deep learning methods
were essentially already well known in the eighties, and were largely abandoned in the
intervening time as too complex and prone to overfitting.
Some attribute the new found success of deep learning methods to a combination of
more powerful hardware and, crucially, much larger data sets that have become avail-
able following the advent of the internet and social networks. Recent studies on sim-
plified models have shown how the optimisation problem itself (a notorious stumbling
block for early generations of deep learning) may become simpler in the large-data
regime [28, 23, 8, 15, 11, 4]. However, this explanation is still unsatisfactory: it is well
known that approximating a Lipschitz continuous function to a fixed precision requires
a number of instances that grows exponentially with the dimension of the function’s
domain (e.g. [33]). AI methods routinely provide excellent performance on very high-
dimensional (∼ 104) data sets consisting of a few million examples. These numbers
may seem very large, but, in terms of learning general functions of tens of thousands
of variables, they are not.1
A second, less widely known limitation of deep AI methodologies is their vulnera-
bility to adversarial attacks. As early as 2013 [30], researchers observed that minimal
perturbations to test data could completely overturn the prediction of a deep learning
algorithm. For example, in a computer vision application, flipping a suitably chosen
single pixel in a (correctly classified) image of a dog could return a prediction of a
cat [27]. While this observation did not stop the onward march of AI (even in safety
critical applications such as self-driving cars), no effective solutions to the problem
of adversarial vulnerability of deep learning methods have been found. A competition
held at the last edition of the premier machine learning conference NIPS provided some
promising preliminary results [2], but unfortunately further work [34] later showed that
even these defences could be broken with a stronger attack strategy.
In this brief report, we take an alternative, geometric perspective to analyse the per-
formance of AI methods on high-dimensional data sets. We focus on the simple case of
binary classification: the prediction task consists of assigning a binary label to points
in a high dimensional vector space (which we will take to be RN for simplicity), based
on a training set of labelled instances. Extension to multi-class classification problems
is trivial. Our arguments show that indeed complex high dimensional classifiers can
perform well only when the data distribution exhibit some special properties. Addi-
tionally, we show that vulnerability is a direct consequence of the structures that make
learning successful, and therefore the inevitable other side of the performance medal.
We focus on providing intuitive arguments that can cover the general situations, rather
than rigour; proofs would be difficult to provide without strong simplifying assump-
tions, and would not necessarily add to our understanding of the root causes of the
1Images from the ImageNet dataset [1], typically used to train deep Convolutional Neural Network for
classification, have a working resolution of 256x256 pixels, with three channels, which amounts to an input
space of about n = 195, 000 dimensions. Approximating a Lipschitz function with Lipschitz constant L
with error  requires O((L

)n) points, which is a super-astronomical number even for relatively large .
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2 Results
To make progress, we start by introducing the concept of a locally complex classifier.
Let D be a data set consisting of input/ output pairs {xi, yi}, assumed to be drawn
i.i.d. from an (unknown) distribution p(x, y). Input variables x are points in a high-
dimensional vector space x ∈ RN , withN very large, while outputs y are binary labels.
A classifier is therefore a mapC : RN → {−1, 1} assigning to each point in input space
a binary label. We will assume all classifiers to be locally constant functions, meaning
that, for almost every point in input space classified as 1 (resp. -1), there exists a
finite neighbourhood where the classifier does not change value. The discriminant dC
defined by the classifier C is the boundary in RN of the pre-image of the value 1 (or
equivalently -1); from the local constancy assumption, it follows that the discriminant
is a set of measure 0, and defines a surface within RN . The discriminant surface is
the central object of study in this paper; the following definition allows us to reason
precisely on the complexity of the discriminant.
Definition. A classifier C : RN → {−1, 1} is locally complex at x∗ if the discrimi-
nant dC near x∗ can be well approximated locally by a set of Ω(N) independent linear
equations wTi x+ c = 0.
Intuitively, this definition captures the complexity of the discriminant by trying to
quantify its ”wriggliness” in high dimensions (see Figure 1), requiring the discriminant
to be defined by a number of linear equalities of order N . Locally complex classifiers
include fully grown decision trees, and deep neural networks with large numbers of
nodes; in particular, deep networks using the popular rectified linear units (ReLU)
activation function partition the input space in a large number of polyhedra (exponential
in the number of layers) so that they are locally complex at very many points. Linear
classifiers, on the other hand, express their discriminant as a single inequality, and are
therefore not complex anywhere (as is to be expected).
What can the local geometry of the discriminant tell us on the performance of the
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classifier? Complex predictors in machine learning are often associated with overfit-
ting problems, and indeed the following observation suggests that this problem, under
certain conditions, affects all locally complex classifiers.
Observation. Let xi be a training point where the classifier is locally complex, and
let the (class conditional) data generating distribution be non-degenerate and with un-
bounded support in all directions. Then, with high probability, nearby points drawn
from the data generating distribution will be misclassified.
This follows simply from the fact that generating a nearby point is equivalent to
sampling a ”noisy version” of the training point, and since the noise is unbounded in
all directions the probability that in at least one of the Ω(N) “fragile” directions (i.e.
those defining the discriminant) we sample a value that crosses the boundary grows
to one exponentially in N . We remark that unbounded support is a very common
assumption for a noise model; for example, the multivariate Gaussian distribution has
support over the whole of RN .
This observation implies that, if a locally complex classifier performs empirically
well in high dimensions, then the true data distribution must concentrate. In other
words, test points must lay on a subset of the input space of very small dimension.
This observation chimes with many intuitive explanations proffered in recent years for
the success of deep learning, which variously remarked on the high degree of symmetry
of natural images, or on the equivalence of many local optima of the networks. In the
following, we will assume that the support of the data distribution lies exactly on a
low-dimensional submanifold of the ambient input space, of dimension M  N .
The true low-dimensionality of the data directly solves the conundrum of function
approximation in high dimension: approximating a function requires data sets of expo-
nentially increasing size only if the function is genuinely defined on a high dimensional
domain. If all we need is a good approximation on a very small subset of the space, then
the problem no longer arises. Still, the result of learning a high-dimensional classifier
is a function defined on the whole ambient space.
What will this function look like outside of the constrained data manifold? The
precise answer will depend on many factors, including the training procedure and data,
yet we can safely assume that it will be essentially random once sufficiently far from the
data manifold. And if the data manifold is genuinely concentrated in low dimensions
and embedded in a high dimensional space, sufficiently far might actually mean very
near. To see why, consider the following simple example.
Example: a linear classifier for apparently high dimensional data. Consider a
data generating distribution whose class-conditionals are well-separated Gaussians in
M  N dimensions (see Figure 2 for N=2, M=1). Let us use logistic regression
(LR) to classify this data; LR defines a hyperplane as a discriminant, and therefore
requires the specification of a bias vector (N parameters) and an orthogonal unit vector
(N − 1 parameters). Since the data is well separated, LR will find very accurately the
optimal M − 1 dimensional hyperplane in the data space, constraining N + M − 1
parameters. The remaining N −M parameters are unconstrained, and their value will
be essentially random. If we interpret the unconstrained parameters as azimuth angles,
4
angle
discriminant
data manifold
Figure 2: Schematic exemplification of fragility of linear classifiers in high-dimension.
then the distance from any data point to the discriminant will be proportional to the sine
of one such angles. If N is very large and N −M is O(N), the probability that at least
one angle, hence the distance of a training point from the discriminant, will be smaller
than a constant  will approach 1 exponentially, therefore showing that this classifier is
fragile by construction.
This property is essentially equivalent to other observations in literature about lack
of robustness of linear classifiers, though it has a clearer geometric flavour. For in-
stance, in [5], the authors observe that principal components corresponding to small
eigenvalues can have an associated high weight of the linear classifier. This can be
seen as the counterpart of having low angular coordinates. This clearly explains why
linear attacks are easy to find in high-dimensional models [14], particularly when the
data manifold has a much lower dimensionality: a step away from the manifold will
typically involve a linear combination of several directions normal to the manifold hav-
ing large weights, resulting in a big change in the linear classifier. Moreover, several
such directions will retain large weights also when learned on a different dataset, as
the weights are assigned randomly, showing that linear attacks are likely to generalise
[14].
Notice that Logistic Regression is not a locally complex classifier. Indeed, under
some simplifying conditions, [10] recently proved that any classifier in high dimen-
sions is vulnerable when the data distribution is low dimensional. Geometry in high-
dimensional spaces has also been recently advocated as a possible cause for adversarial
attacks in [12], where authors study a highly idealised scenario in which two-class data
is distributed in two concentric spheres, and observe that misclassified points tend to
appear on average close to any test point, with a distance decreasing with the square
root of the dimension. A similar result, in a more general setting of a two classes prob-
lem on a sphere or a unit cube, has been discussed very recently in [24], leveraging
specialised isoperimetric inequalities and connecting it to some geometric properties
connected with the the data manifold.
An additional intriguing feature is that many adversarial examples (i.e. small per-
turbations almost indistinguishable by humans that fool deep classifiers) generalise to
different architectures, possibly trained on different datasets [14, 31]. Also in this case,
the geometry of the data manifold and its embedding in a high dimensional space are
likely to be involved. On the one hand, one can find directions that generate examples
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which are sufficiently far from the data manifold, the so called linear attacks in [14].
The high dimensionality of the input space de facto implies that such directions exist
and are common, also for simple linear models. However, not all adversarial exam-
ples are of this category, and the low dimensional data manifold itself is likely to be
intrinsically complex once embedded into a high-dimensional space. This intuitively
means that each point in the data manifold is likely to be close to other parts of the
manifold corresponding to different classes. Evidence in this direction comes from the
fact that adversarial examples have been found to typically have a higher local intrinsic
dimensionality than training points [3, 19], suggesting that robust adversarial examples
are found in directions in space where the data manifold folds and has a more complex
local geometry (see Figure 3).
3 Discussion
In summary, our results recapitulate a number of previous observations that were broadly
conjectured in the technical community, bringing them together under a novel, intu-
itive geometric perspective. A major new insight arising from this perspective is that
complex classifiers can only work well in circumstances where they necessarily are
vulnerable.
Our work also illustrates some possible directions to ameliorate the problem. Sev-
eral groups are already investigating the possibility of adding local consistency con-
straints to the objective function of a neural network classifier [31, 14, 13, 21, 20, 7]
for example in the form of∞-norm robustness. Such approaches show promise, yet,
in order not to compromise performance, only very light regularisation can be applied.
An alternative is to avoid the high-dimensionality trap by pre-processing data with a
dimensionality reduction technique [22, 32]. Such an approach is appealing, as it may
greatly simplify the data manifold geometry, and in some simple cases can be anal-
ysed theoretically [6], though it may still be vulnerable to white box adversarial attacks
when combined in a pipeline with a (complex) classifier [24]. Notions of intrinsic di-
mensionality [9, 19] may play a useful role in understanding vulnerability, and indeed
PCA has been advocated as a defense strategy against adversarial attacks [5]. A dif-
ferent direction would be to adopt a Bayesian perspective, provided we can tackle its
formidable computational challenges: this would both regularise unconstrained direc-
6
tions and, by quantifying posterior uncertainty on model parameters, would potentially
automatically detect vulnerable directions.
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